An exchange economy with complete markets is described and a general theorem for the existence of active Nash equilibria is proved. It is further shown that under replication of traders, these equilibria approach competitive equilibria of the economy. The model under discussion here was first proposed by L. Shapley and represents one of two' possible generalizations of the 'single money' model described in Dubey and Shubik (1978) . It has the pleasant feature that it yields consistent prices.
Introduction
There are two models for trade with complete markets which have been analyzed as strategic market games. One was posed by Shubik and is discussed in Amir et al. (1987) . That model has m goods trading in m(m -l)/ 2 different markets (one for each pair of goods), where the price formation is completely independent in each market. Thus if i, j and k are three goods and Pij is the price of i in terms of j, etc. then the consistency property pijpp=pik need not hold.
The second model which is discussed here was posed by Shapley, and is somewhat more sophisticated than the first model. It links all trades together through a single clearing system. The rule of 'one good one price' is implicit in the mechanism (as opposed to the first model which may be characterized as 'one market one price'). At first glance it may appear to be less intuitively *This work relates to Department of the Navy Contract NO001486-K0220 issued by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR 047a6. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the Government, and no official endorsement shoud be inferred. The United States Government has at least a royalty-free non-exclusive and irrevocable license throughout the world for Government purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver, perform, dispose of, and to authorize others so to do, all or any portion of this work. The first author is grateful to N. Thurston, A. Himonas and T.Y. Lee for helpful discussions.
'See Amir et al. (1987) for the other generalization of Dubey and Shubik (1978) .
0304-4068/89/%3.50 0 1989, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland) obvious to pool all trades, but in a modern economy with anonymous trades, clearing houses perform an essential role. Furthermore, as we show in this paper, the equilibria that this model produces, converge, under replication, to competitive equilibria. This to us, seems to indicate the nature of a clearing system which provides the financing of transactions (implicit) in the general equilibrium model.
Description of the model
Let 1,={1,2 ,..., n> and Z,={l,2,... ,m} be the sets of traders and commodities, respectively; where both m and n are at least 2. We shall use superscripts a and /.3 for traders, and subscripts i and j for commodities.
We assume that each trader a has a non-negative initial endowment a;hO of each commodity i. The traders' utility functions u" are assumed to be concave, increasing and continuous from the non-negative orthant R", to R,. Assume that there are at least two traders with positioe initial endowments and utility functions which are continuously differentiable in the interior of R",. Further, assume' that for these traders, the level sets of their utility functions through their initial endowments are completely contained in the interior of R",.
For convenience, let us fix units such that The ith column of the matrix B" is to be thought of as a vector of commodities that trader a offers in exchange for commodity i.
The strategy set of a is the set of all matrices B" satisfying (1) and (2), and is denoted by S".
Write S=S'x...xS"x~.~ x S". Then S is compact and convex and a point BES represents an n-tuple of bids -one by each trader.
Let r be the game in which B=(B', . . . , B")ES has the outcome determined in the following steps. First, we define the aggregate bid matrix B to be 'This assumption is satisfied, for instance, by Cobb-Douglas utility functions. We also need a related notion:
Definition 3. A non-negative G x L' matrix A is said to be completely reducible if there is a partition .Z1,. . . ,J, of { 1,. . . ,t}, such that (a) for each s=l,..., t, the IJ,I x /.Z,I b t su ma rix A(_!,) of A (with rows and columns in J,) is irreducible; (b) if s#s' and ~EJ, and jEJ,, then aij=O.
In other words, a matrix is completely reducible if and only if (after a permutation of indices) it can be written in Mock-diagonal form such that each diagonal block is irreducible. We defer all proofs to a later section. It will be of interest to us to be able to compute all possible market3The prices are best thought of as 'measures of relative worth' of the different commodities. Then (4) says that the cumulative worth of the aggregate commodity bundle being oNered for commodity j is equal to the worth of the total amount of commodity j in the market.
?his is different from Definition 1.6 in Seneta (1973) only in that the 1 x 1 matrix 0 is irreducible according to our definition but not irreducible according to Seneta (1973 In view of Remark 1, it suffices to find market-clearing price vectors for irreducible matrices. This is the content of the next lemma. In other words, the choice of a market-clearing price does not affect the final holdings.
Finally, the payoff to trader a is given by
A Nash Equilibrium (or N.E.) of r is a pair (B,p) satisfying (4) with B=(BQP,..., B")ES such that for each trader a in I, zP(B1,..., B")=sup{n"(B',..., P-r, TB" ,...) B")).
TES
For later purposes, we shall also need to consider the k-fold replication kT of the game r. This is the game in which each player is replaced by k copies of himself, all with the same endowments and utility functions.
We will use Znxk to denote the set of traders in kT. Note that I, may be regarded as the set of trader types for kT. When considering kT, the letters a and /I will be used for typical elements in both I, and I, X ,+ This will lead to no confusion, since the meaning will be clear from the context.
For kT, (3) becomes and (0) becomes A type-symmetric Nash Equilibrium (T.S.N.E.) of kT is an N.E. of 'r such that traders of the same type use the same strategies.
The modified game and active equilibria
Observe that T.S.N.E.'s of kT exist for trivial reasons. For example the n-tuple of strategies in which no trader bids anything is clearly an N.E. with any p>O.
However, as in Dubey and Shubik (1978) , we wish to prove that kT has non-pathological T.S.N.E.'s which converge to competitive equilibria as k approaches infinity. The proof is in several steps. We start with the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 which were deferred from the previous section. These are easy consequences of well-known facts about non-negative matrices.
Proof of Lemma 2. Clearly det(A") is zero (J*l'=O, where 1' is the column vector of all l's). So if p is as in the statement of the Lemma, then, by elementary linear algebra, p * A" = 0.
For k= 1, the rest of the Lemma is trivially true; so let us assume kz2. In this case A can have no non-zero row (or column). Let T =d(A)-'A and let Cij be the ijth cofactor of (I -T), then Aij> 0 if and only if Cij> 0. By definition T is row-stochastic, so Theorem 2.3 of Seneta (1973) (applied to T) implies that cij> 0 for all i and j; in particular p > 0. Finally, qA" =0 is equivalent to q=qT; and by Perron-Frobenius Theory [Theorem 1.5 of Seneta (1973) ] 1 is an eigenvalue of T with multiplicity 1. This proves the uniqueness of p.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma I. In view of Lemma 2 and Remark 1, it only remains to prove that if there is vector p such that p > 0 and pB=O, then B is completely reducible. With this in view, consider the matrices A =Z +B and T = d(A)-'A. Then T is row stochastic and p satisfies pT = 57 Also, B is completely reducible if and only if T is completely reducible.
A row-stochastic matrix may be thought of as the transition matrix of a Markov chain [see section 4.1 of Seneta (1973) ]; and it will be useful to think of T in these terms.
5Since the m x m zero matrix is completely reducible, but not irreducible for mz2 (as we have assumed in section 2), it is clear that this delinition excludes the trivial equilibrium. Moreover, Theorem 2 in section 4 shows that this is the 'right' notion.
As in section 1.2 of Seneta (1973) , we say that i leads to j if t$'>O (for some k = k(i, j)) and write i+ j. If i does not lead to j, then we write if, j. If i+ j and j-i, we say that i and j communicate, and write i-j. An index i is said to be inessential if there is a j such that i+ j but j+i; otherwise i is said to be essential.
If i is essential and i+ j, then ictj. So the essential states may be partitioned into equivalence classes such that all states belonging to a single class communicate, but cannot lead to a state outside the class.
It sullices to show that the existence of a p>O such that pT=p implies that there are no inessential states.
Let us normalize p so that cp,= 1; then p can be interpreted as a steady-state probability distribution for T. Let J, be the essential states and let J-be the inessential states; then if jE J-, there is a jE J, such that t$')>O. [Clearly t(ijk)> 0 for some essential j, with k = k(i, j) sm. Since tii>O, we must have t$')>O.] In other words, if the process starts in J-, there is a positive probability x=mini,,_ maxi,,, (t$") that it is in J, after m steps. Since, once the process leaves J-it never returns, the probability that the process is still in J _ after em steps is less than (1 -R)~ which approaches zero as G tends to infinity. Consequently, any steady-state distribution must assign zero probability to all inessential states. Since p>O, there can be no inessential states.
As in Dubey and Shubik (1978) , it is convenient to consider slight perturbations of the game r.
Definition 5. Given E >O, we define the game r(a) as in section 2, except that (3) is replaced by 6ij= C b~j+e. eel,
The interpretation is that some outside agency places fixed bids of E for each pair (i, j). This does not change the strategy sets of the various players, but does affect the prices, the final holdings and the payoffs.
The next step in the proof of Theorem 1 is to prove existence of N.E.'s for f(~). First, note that for r(a) with E>O, B is always irreducible, so the prices may be computed as in Lemma 2. Also, if a changes his bids along the diagonal of B", it does not affect the prices or the payoffs of any of the traders. The upshot is that we may restrict all the traders' strategy sets by requiring (9) without changing the game r(s) in any essential way.
The next remark is more subtle. For fixed bids BB by traders other than a, define the matrix D by dij= (10)
Then (4) can be rewritten as or And substituting in (6), we obtain pi = ag + C dji -C dij(pi/pj).
I (11)
In other words, the final holding by a depends on a's bid only through its effect on the prices! So let us consider the possible prices that arise as a varies his bid in S". First of all, notice that (0) and (9) 
The next lemma is crucial. In fact, it is more or less the heart of the argument. Then it is easily checked that A is row stochastic and pA = p. Consequently
PEP.
In view of (14) above, Lemma 3 has an immediate implication for a's final holding set. So by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
=F (PAi) "*Cij=CriCije i
So by Lemma 3, r E P. This proves (a). Next, let p and q be the prices at two strategies which yield x and y, respectively. By part (a), there is a strategy which achieves the price vector r, where rj = (p,qj) U* for all j. Then if z is the final holding obtained by this strategy; we have by (14) Since u' is concave and increasing, (c) and (d) follow from the strict A.M.-G.M. inequality in (18).
For (e), the set in question is the set of all strategies yielding stochastic matrices A such that fiA =fi. But this set is clearly closed and convex. Since S" is compact, this proves part (e).
We can now prove the existence of N.E.'s for r(e).
Lemma 5. For each E>O, r(e) has an N.E.
Proof: Let S=S'x..*xS~x.** x S" as before. Given bids by all the traders except a, define the 'best response set' of a to be the set of strategies in S" which maximizes a's payoff. By Lemma 4, the 'best response set' is compact, convex and non-empty. Thus, if @ is the correspondence: S+2' given by then @ is upper semi-continuous by Berge (1963, p. 116) . Also, by Lemma 4, the image of each point is compact, convex and non-empty. Thus, by Kakutani's fixed point theorem, there is a point B in S such that BE Q(B). Such a B is easily seen to be an N.E.
Since s>O, the matrix B as defined by (8) is clearly irreducible for all B. However, we wish to examine the equilibria for r(s) as E+O, and the limiting aggregate bid matrices (even if they exist) need not be irreducible. So we need a slight strengthening of Lemma 5.
Definition 6. For 6 >O, a strategy B" in S" will be called b-positive for a if, for each J c I,,
An n-tuple B=(B' , . . . , B") will be called &positive, if B" is &positive for each trader a with positive endowments of all commodities. (Recall that there are at least two such traders.)
The concept of b-positivity is just right for our purposes. As an illustration we have To see this we need only apply (19) with J=J, (where Jr,. . . , J, are as in Definition 3), the second part of the remark being a consequence of the assumption that two traders have positive endowments.
On the other hand, we can easily prove the following Proof. Let D and C be as in (10) and (13), and let p be the 'best response' price as in Lemma 4(d). Then to prove Lemma 6, we need to find A such that A is row-stochastic, A 2 C, p = pA and w I1 a..+aji)z6, where 6r =(l +me)-'6(a).
(21)
In view of Lemma 3 it suffices to find a substochastic matrix E such that EZC, p2pE and for all Jcl, 1 1 (eij+eji)26,.
i$J jeJ (22) (Given E, we can apply Lemma 3 with E instead of C and obtain A 1 E 2 C satisfying our requirements.)
To obtain such a matrix, note first that if u is as in (15), then (lo), (13), (20) and (21) 
So if w is as in (16), then (17) gives
In particular, we can choose an index j, such that In other words, E is obtained by adding 6r to each entry in the joth column of c.
Then (22) clearly holds, and we only need to show that p-pE20.
The only change from (16) 
and write S(6) for the set of &positive n-tuples in S. [See (20) and Definition
6.1
Then S(6) is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of S. We can now obtain the desired strengthening of Lemma 5.
Lemma 7. Let 6 be given by (25) then, for each E s-0, I
has a b-positive
N.E.
Proof. Let @ be defined as in the proof of Lemma 5. Consider the modification @' given by P(B) = @(B) n S(6). Then by Lemma 6, @J'(B) is compact, convex and non-empty for each B. Since @' is clearly u.s.c., it has a fixed point which is easily seen to be a 6-positive N.E.
In section 2 we described the game kT (k-fold replication of r). A natural analogue of Definition 5 is Definition 7. Given E >O, we define the game kr(s) as in section 2 except that (7) is replaced by As in Dubey and Shubik (1978) , Lemma 7 may be refined to Lemma 8. With 6 as in (25) Proof. In the argument proving Lemma 7, let S* be the set of typesymmetric strategies. Define @*: s*+2s* a*(B) = G'(B) n S*. Now S* is compact and convex (in fact S* x S). Furthermore (since in a type-symmetric situation, players of the same type face the same optimization problem) W(B) n S* # 4. So 9*(B) is compact, convex and not empty. Since @* is clearly u.s.c., Kakutani's theorem yields a fixed point of @* which is easily seen to be a &positive T.S.N.E. of 'r(s).
The next step is to show uniform positivity of prices at various T.S.N.E.'s of the various kr(s)'s.
Lemma 9. There is a constant q > 0, such that: for all E less than 1, and all k, if p is the price vector at any i3.N.E. of any 'r(~), normalized so that cipi= 1, (27) Proof: Let a and fi be two traders who satisfy the stronger assumption in section 2. First, notice that if x is an N.E. final holding by a trader of type a, we must have u"(x) 2 #(aa). So by the assumptions on u", (where aif=af/axi). We will show that we can choose q= l/(mMm-I). Suppose not. Then for some .s>O, kr(s) has a T.S.N.E. (B,p) with some pi c II. We may assume without loss of generality that Since the prices are normalized, we must have p1 2 l/m, and so Then there must be an index 4 such that
Let B be the aggregate bid matrix as in (26) and consider the quantities VI= 1 C 6ijpi and ~2 = 1
Since p is market-clearing, we have f pi&,= f pj&ji all jCZ,.
i=l i=l
Summing this over j in {/+ 1,. . . , m> and cancelling common terms, we obtain vl =v2. If v denotes the common value of vl and v2, then at least one of the following inequalities is true:
For the sake of definiteness, assume the one with a.
Let D = B -B", then using (1 l), we have for all i
But by (28), Xi > 0, and since UT + Cjdij=G Sij [by (9)]. We get pi ( > 1 Sij >Cp,dji for all i. j i
Conversely, if 4 is any price vector which satisfies the above inequalities in place of p, then Lemma 3 implies that a can achieve the prices q by a suitable strategy. In particular, if A> 0 is suffkiently small, then a can achieve the prices q=(p1, ..., Pd, (l+l)p, +, , ..., (l+I)p, ) .
We compute the change in the final holdings of a if he changes the prices from p to q. This is given by Now by assumption,
SO
and since Ci~~C~~~+r dtiPt5vg we get Since x is an N.E. holding, the first term must be negative, so
Taking 1 sufficiently small, we obtain a contradiction to (29). This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 is an easy consequence.
Proof of Theorem I. Fix k and consider the games 'T(I!-') for e E N. By Lemma 8, we can find for each 8 a b-positive T.S.N.E. B(e) with normalized prices p(e). Since B(e) and p(l) range in compact sets, we may assume (passing to a subsequence if necessary) that B(e) and p(e) converge to B and P* Let B and B(8) be the aggregate bid matrices [as in (7), and in (26) with e=K '1, and define 5 and B(t) as in (5). Also, by Lemma 9, Pih q for all i. So Lemma 1 applies and it follows that B must be completely reducible. Since each B(e) is b-positive, B must be 6-positive and so, by Remark 3, B is irreducible.
It remains only to show that (B,p) is a T.S.N.E. for kZ. To see this, consider a trader a in I, X k. Let x"(e) and X" be the final holdings by a at Z?(e) and B. Let B(IT;G) and B(T) be the new nk-tuples after a switches to a strategy T at B(e) and B. We divide the argument into two cases.
Case 1. B(T) is completely reducible. Clearly @IT; 6') is irreducible; and by Remark 3, so is B(T)! By Lemma 2, market clearing prices exist at B(IT: 6') and B(T); and if we call them p( Tie) and p(T), then p( T;e)-+p( 7). Consequently, if x'(T, e) and x"(T) are the final holdings by a at B(T, z?') and B(T), then Also x=(+-+x= as !+co.
Since B( IT: e) is an N.E., we must have u=(x=(e)) 2 U=(X= ( IT; 8) ).
Letting /+ao, we obtain u"(x") 2 u=x=( T)).
Case 2. If B(T) is not completely reducible, then x=(T) =a' so u=(x=(T)) = u=(a=)~u=(x=(d))-+#"(x=).
This shows that (B,p) is an N.E. The rest of the Theorem is clear.
We have actually proved a stronger result than Theorem 1. For later use we will call it 
Convergence of active equilibria
Consider now the sequence of games kZ as k-co. By Theorem 1, each kT has an active T.S.N.E. B(k) with normalized prices p(k). Since B(k) is type-symmetric we may view it as an element in S =S' x **a x S" (rather than in X ,_InxkSa). Now B(k) and p(k) range in fixed compact sets and, passing to a subsequence, we may ensure that they converge.
We wish to examine the nature of these limits [as in Dubey and Shubik (1978) ].
Given a price vector p > 0, we define the budget set of a trader of type a to be the set BS=(p)={xERm,:p*x=p-u").
A competitive equilibrium for r is a price p together with allocations x", a=l,..., n such that for each a,
Given prices p>O and a bid B" by a, we define the competitive outcome of (B", p) to be the allocation 6This should be compared with the corresponding result in Dubey and Shubik (1978) , where additional conditions are needed on the amount of money and its distribution.
Then by (0) and (9), A(v) is stochastic; and if B(v) is the aggregate bid matrix at B(k,) [as in (7) 
Suppose now that (b) does not hold. Then there is a player of type a and an allocation y in BS"(p), such that 
Since q( IT; v) and p are multiples of q(T, v) and q, we may rewrite (40) and (41) 
Letting v+co in (45) and using (44) and part (a) of this theorem, we get u=(x=) 2 u"(y) which contradicts (39). This completes the proof of Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
There are two kinds of possible 'converses' to Theorem 2. The 'easy' converse involves a game with a continuum of players. It is straightforward to check that any competitive equilibrium is also an N.E. We omit the details.
A more interesting question is whether every competitive equilibrium is the limit (in the sense of Theorem 2) of T.S.N.E.'s of the games kT. We leave this as an open pdblem (possibly for a future paper).
